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Abstract
This paper argues that the housing affordability and wealth inequality crises 
facing advanced economies are driven by the emergence of a feedback cycle 
between finance and landed property.  The cycle has been created by the 
increasing policy preference for private home ownership coupled with the 
liberalisation of bank credit and accompanying financial innovation. Under 
such conditions, landed property becomes both the most attractive form of 
collateral for the banking system and the most desirable form of financial 
asset for households and investors.   The housing-finance cycle emerged in 
Anglo-Saxon economies in the 1980s but has since spread to most advanced 
economies.  Demand-side reforms, more than supply-side reforms that 
dominate policy discussion, are required to break this cycle. Two reforms are 
discussed: 1) structural and institutional reforms to banking systems, 
including central banks; and 2) land policy reforms targeted at reducing the 
potential for rent extraction and speculative profits from property ownership. 
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1. Introduction
This paper argues that the advanced economy housing affordabilty crisis has 
its roots in the interaction between the strong policy preference for private 
home ownership, realised through various state subsidies and fiscal 
advantages and a deregulated and (globally) liberalised financial system. 
Their interaction creates a positive feedback cycle that drives up property 
prices at a much faster rate than incomes, ultimately makes housing 
increasingly unaffordable for a large proportion of the population. 
The essential economic dynamics of the housing-finance cycle are simple. It 
involves the interaction of two commodities with diametrically opposed 
properties: land (upon which all housing must be situated) and bank credit. 
As was recognised by the classical political economists (Ricardo, Smith and 
Mill), land is unique as a ‘factor of production’, being inherently scarce, fixed 
and irreproducible. Whilst not all land is equally scarce, desirable land (i.e. 
attractive location near to decent paid work and other amenities) is inherently 
limited in supply.  In contrast, the creation and allocation of bank credit and 
money is relatively unconstrained in modern economies (Ryan-Collins et al 
2012; Turner 2017). The deregulation and liberalisation of advanced economy 
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banking systems in the 1980s and 1990s led to an explosion in the quantity of 
credit (relative to output and incomes), most of which was concentrated in 
domestic property loans rather than the textbook model of bank lending 
supporting business investment and working capital (Jorda et al 2016).
Since the majority of mortgage loans finance the purchase of existing rather 
than new property, the inevitable result is house price inflation.  With the 
support of bank credit, households bid up the price of land as they compete 
for property in more desirable locations. This creates even more demand for 
mortgage debt which then flows in to existing property and so on.  In other 
words, the supply of bank mortgage credit can be seen to create its own 
increased demand – via rising property prices - for ever more mortgage credit.
Broader changes in bank business models and financial innovations – in 
particular the emergence of mortgage-backed securitisation – and the 
increasing involvement of other non-bank financial institutions in property 
have amplified the cycle, in particular in the decade running up to the 
financial crisis. Post-crisis, whilst new macroprudential regulations have 
repressed mortgage credit in some countries, monetary policy has played an 
amplificatory role, with the ultra-low medium to long term interest rates 
generated by central bank Quantitative Easing programs increasing the 
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attractiveness of real estate as a financial asset - relative to other safe haven 
assets – for capital market investment.  
None of this is to say that finance has been the only driver of rising house 
prices in the last few decades. Supply side factors – a collapse in public 
affordable housing provision, inelastic planning regimes, inefficiencies in the 
construction industry and national and local housing policies – have 
important effects in particular economies and in particular regions within 
those economies. But policy debate – outside the academies of political 
economy and economic geography - has largely focused almost exclusively 
upon supply-side dynamics, neglecting domestic and international demand 
for property as a financial asset (Gallent et al 2017).
Both the left and the right of the political spectrum have been guilty of this.  
On the Left, a consensus has grown around the need to build more 
(affordable) homes with little consideration as to the implications of such a 
large expansion in terms of land availability in desirable locations.  
Meanwhile, the Right has tended to focus on liberalising planning 
frameworks and removing other market ‘frictions’, neglecting the fact that 
planning rules only exist because of the scarce nature of desirable land. This 
failure to consider demand-side policy developments reflects the dominance 
of conventional, neo-classical economic theory in framing policy challenges. 
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This, broadly speaking, assumes land and credit are essentially subject to the 
same, equilibrium-based rules of supply and demand as any other 
commodity in the long-run, neglecting their unique properties of scarcity 
(land) and elasticity (credit).  Excessively high house prices are, according to 
the supply-side approach, mainly due to artificial constraints (e.g. planning 
and zoning constraints or related government interference) that prevent 
efficient market clearing (see, inter alia, Glaeser et al 2005; Glaeser et al 2008; 
Hilber and Vermuelen 2010). The role of economic rent is also largely ignored 
in this narrative. Land rent extraction via capital gains by homeowners or 
investors and via interest charges and securitisation fees flowing to banks and 
non-bank financial institutions are neglected. 
Related literature
This paper aligns with the economic geography and political economy 
literatures on land and housing as a financial asset and urban land rents 
(Coakley 1994; Harvey 1978, 1982, Haila 1990).  Harvey, building on Marx, 
argued that the built environment is drawn in to the capitalist profit seeking 
effort as a result of ‘capital switching’ that occurs once the primary, 
productive circuit of profit is exhausted due to overaccumulation.  This is 
only possible with the emergence of mature credit markets - indeed, Harvey 
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argues there is a parallel between land titles and interest-bearing bank loans 
which are both forms of ‘fictitious capital’. 
Harvey’s work stimulated debate on the nature of urban land rent in the 
1980s and early 1990s (King 1989; Haila 1990 and see Ward and Albers 2016 
for recent overview). A number of scholars have argued Harvey’s theory was 
economically deterministic, neglecting important institutional, cultural and 
socio-economic and spatial dynamics that mediated the relationship between 
(finance) capital and property (Ball 1985, Haila 1988, Katz 1986; King 1989). 
One contribution of this paper is to provide some institutional and historical 
fleshing out of the property-finance relationship that emphasizes the 
differences, rather than similarities between property and credit-money, and 
how macroeconomic policy choices can shape their interaction to generate 
different outcomes. 
More recent, post-crisis interventions have focused on the financialisation of 
housing as a key channel for the transmission of neoliberal dynamics in late 
modern capitalism (Seabrooke and Schwartz 2008; Rolnik 2013; Aalbers & 
Christophers 2014; Aalbers 2016), in particular as a means via which capitalist 
economies can maintain demand in the face of stagnating wages and 
productivity. The deregulation and liberalisation of mortgage finance enabled 
households to borrow against the increasing rise in the value of their homes 
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to fund consumption, a form of ‘privatised Keynesianism’ (Crouch 2009; 
Watson 2010) that enabled the boom of the 1990s-2000s to last so long.  Rising 
house prices and widespread home-ownership – both enabled by 
financialisation – is also tied to the neo-liberal concept of ‘asset-based welfare’ 
(Doling & Ronald 2010; Watson 2009) where the state withdraws from 
provision of economic support for the under- and un-employed and 
pensioners, with (liquid) property wealth taking its place as a new, but rather 
uneven safety net. The housing financialisation literature
emphasizes the diversity of forms of ‘residential capitalism’ (Seabrooke and 
Schwartz 2008; Aalbers 2017) but also postulates a general tendency in 
advanced economies of housing becoming more tightly interwoven in to 
banking systems and financial markets and housing policy being increasingly 
determined by the needs of those markets rather than supporting access to 
housing (Aalbers 2016; Rolnik 2019).
The additional contribution of this paper is to provide a theoretical and 
historical elaboration, accompanied by recent data, of the housing-finance 
cycle as a critique of conventional neoclassical economic theory and its neglect 
of the key properties of credit and land.  In doing so, it draws on 
Schumpeterian and post-keynesian economic theory which emphasises the 
role of credit-money and uncertainty in determining the trajectory of the 
macroeconomy and its effect on asset prices; and links this to the classical 
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political economists’ concern with land rents as a key constraint on capitalist 
growth.   Secondly, the paper develops a broadbased macroeconomic policy 
reform agenda targeted specifically at breaking this cycle and reducing the 
speculative demand for housing. 
Breaking the housing-finance cycle, it is argued, will require structural 
political economy reforms that go well beyond the standard supply-side 
measures currently on offer. The paper focuses in particular on: 1) 
institutional and structural reforms to banking systems, including central 
banks; and 2) reforms to the distribution of land rents (or land value capture), 
best addressed by changes to fiscal policy, land-ownership and housing 
tenure.  In both cases, examples can be found in modern capitalist economies, 
suggesting change is possible, despite the likely strong resistance from vested 
interests. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows.  Section two outlines the 
dynamics of the housing-finance cycle in terms of theory, history and 
macroeconomic policy developments. Sections 3 and 4 examine financial 
reforms and reforms to land value capture that might be effective in breaking 
the housing-finance feedback cycle respectively. Section 5 concludes.
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2. Dynamics of the housing-finance cycle 
2.1 Economic theory and evidence  
Banks create new credit, money and purchasing power in the act of lending – 
money is not borrowed from elsewhere in the economy (McLeay et al. 2014; 
Ryan-Collins et al. 2012).  When a bank makes a ‘loan’ it creates a new, 
income-generating asset for itself alongside a mirroring liability (the deposit) 
which is effectively money since, in normal times, it is accepted at par with 
cash and central bank reserves and thus can be used to discharge tax 
obligations to the state. The making of a loan places no significant limits on a 
bank’s ability to make future such loans in modern economies where central 
banks ‘accommodate’ expansions in the money supply by providing reserves 
on demand to the banking system. In this sense, bank credit is highly elastic 
and able to adjust rapidly to changing economic conditions. 
Schumpeter (1934) viewed banks as the ‘ephor’ of the capitalist economy. 
Credit creation enabled entrepreneurs to obtain a share of the economy’s 
resources prior to production, allowing them to ‘carry out new combinations’ 
(innovation) and thus compete effectively with incumbent firms. This is key 
in enabling the process of ‘creative destruction’ that is a feature of dynamic 
capitalist economies. Similarly, Keynes described capitalism as a system of 
‘monetary production’ in the sense that ‘[bank] Credit expansion provides not 
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an alternative to increased saving but a necessary preparation for it’ (1939 p. 
572). 
Credit is thus key to innovation and economic growth. But there is no 
guarantee that credit will always be allocated efficiently to support economic 
growth. Broadly speaking, credit creation in support of goods-and-services 
transactions leads to GDP growth, whereas credit flows to asset markets raise 
asset prices relative to output prices, encouraging more speculative financing 
and becoming the fuel for capitalism’s instability (Minsky 1975; Werner 2005; 
Bezemer 2014). The theory is supported by a range of empirical studies (see 
Bezemer et al 2018 for a review).  
 
Even without expectations of rising future asset prices, however, a 
deregulated banking system is likely to develop a preference for mortgage 
lending (Ryan-Collins et al 2017).  Due to asymmetric information between 
lenders and borrowers, banks develop a preference for collateral to secure 
loans, rather than raising interest rates – as standard economic theory would 
have it - to high levels for fear of attracting risky borrowers in an adverse 
selection process (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Banks will discriminate against 
debtors whose assets cannot be collateralized, many of them in non-financial 
business who typically have limited liability.  Landed property is one of the 
Page 12 of 64
https://mc04.manuscriptcentral.com/epa
EPA: Economy and Space
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
12
most desirable forms of collateral as it is virtually impossible to hide and 
tends to appreciate over time.  
Until recently, mainstream macroeconomic policy models largely assumed 
that the majority of bank credit supported non-financial investment and it 
was widely held that deeper financial markets would enable more efficient 
capital allocation and hence growth (King & Levine 1993).  But a remarkable 
transformation in the allocation of bank credit has occurred over the past 3 
decades.  Today banks in advanced economies lend significantly more to 
households for the purposes of buying existing housing and real estate than 
they do for either business investment or consumer purchases, as shown in 
two recent comprehensive empirical studies (Jordà et al. 2016; Bezemer et al. 
2017).  
Figure 1 shows outstanding business and mortgage credit and, on the right-
hand axis, house prices, averaged across 17 advanced economies since 1870.  
Up until the 1990s the two credit-series move broadly together but, as a 
proportion of GDP, banks lent more to firms than they did for domestic or 
commercial real estate purchase.  But in the early 1990s, a dramatic change 
occurs. Mortgage lending in advanced economies increases from about 40% of 
GDP to 70% in the space of 20 years whilst the stock of non-mortgage loans 
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flattens, rising by little more than 5%. During the same period, average real 
house prices followed a similar path to mortgage credit, increasing by 50%.i 
Figure 1: Business credit, mortgage credit and real house prices in advanced econoimes since 
1870
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Source: Data taken from Jordà-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory Database, available at 
http://www.macrohistory.net/data/; see Jorda et al (2017) and Knoll et al. (2017).
The visual evidence in Figure 1 is backed by a number of single country and 
cross-country statistical analyses of the causes of house price growth. In a 
study of 19 countries between 1980-2005, the OECD estimates that financial 
deregulation enabling an expansion of mortgage credit has increased real 
house prices by 30%, far more than other variables demand and supply 
variables (Andrews et al. 2011). A similar study by the International Monetary 
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Fund (IMF) but extending to 2010, found that a 10 per cent increase in 
household credit leads to a 6 per cent increase in nominal average house 
prices (IMF 2011 p. 150).  Single country studies of the U.S. (Duca et al. 2011), 
Ireland (Kelly et al. 2018) Japan and the UK (Aron et al. 2012) and Germany 
(Muellbauer 2018) equally find a key role for credit conditions in explaining 
house prices and household consumption. 
The danger from a macroeconomic perspective is that credit creation for the 
purchase of existing property increases land and house prices and household 
debt without stimulating investment or productivity growth. This means 
there is insufficient funds to pay back the interest on the loan, meaning 
households must either take on more debt or reduce their spending, 
repressing demand. This will lead firms to cut back on investment, leading to 
lower profits and stagnating wages. In turn, this feeds in to more demand for 
mortgage debt as house prices continue to rise relative to incomes. Indeed, a 
study of 46 economies over 1990–2011 found a negative relationship between 
the stock of bank lending to domestic real estate and economic growth but 
positive growth effects of credit flows to non-financial business (Bezemer et al. 
2016).
The housing-finance feedback cycle runs against standard economic theory 
where an increase in the supply of goods, all else being equal, should 
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eventually lead to a fall in prices. An ‘equilibrium’ price will be reached at the 
point when the quantity of goods supplied exactly matches the demand for 
them.  But with bank credit and land, we have two phenomenon that are 
quite unlike standard commodities. Bank credit is highly elastic and 
essentially infinite; in contrast land is inherently inelastic due to its scarcity 
(Gaffney 1994).
The housing-finance cycle also has important implications for our 
understanding of economic rent, in particular land rent. Since the 1970s, 
wealth accumulation in many capitalist economies has largely been driven by 
increases in property prices via capital gains, rather than increases in profits 
from the production of goods and services (Rognlie 2014; Stiglitz 2015).  This 
is a return to a form of ‘rentier-capitalism’, where life chances are determined 
not by hard work, innovation or entrepreneurial endeavor but simply by 
whether one is lucky enough to own a piece of land in the right part of the 
country (or city) or invested at the right time in the housing-finance cycle.
In much of the literature rent is viewed as accruing primarily to the land-
owner, following the classical economists’ writings (George 1879; Ricardo 
1817). Whilst, as noted in the introduction, economic geographers have 
provided a more sophisticated treatment of (urban) land rents, emphasising 
how social, cultural and political dynamics mediate rent creation and 
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extraction (King 1989; Ward and Aalbers 2016), less attention has been given 
to the institutional dynamics of the banking system and financial and 
macroeconomic policy more generally, including fiscal policy, in determining 
rent extraction dynamics. But the housing-finance cycle implies the financial 
sector is able to generate and monetize – in the form of interest on mortgage 
debt - a significant proportion of land rents via credit creation (Hudson 2010). 
The phenomenon of securitisation further complicates matters as non-bank 
institutional investors who purchase such mortgage-backed securities from 
banks (and the flow of interest payments that accompany them) can be seen to 
further amplify the cycle and absorb a part of the land rent.
2.2 Potential critiques of the housing-finance cycle hypothesis
One concern with the housing-finance cycle hypothesis is causation. A bank’s 
decision to lend is naturally affected by the demand for loans which in itself is 
driven by what is occurring in the wider economy (most obviously rising 
incomes or increasing populations relative to the supply of new homes). This 
creates endogeneity bias and means that correlations discussed in the 
previous section may not equate to causation from bank credit to house price 
growth.
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Financial deregulation can be seen as a natural experiment to test this 
hypothesis, since it is largely a political rather than economic (and thus 
endogeneous) phenomena. A number of studies show that the Anglo-Saxon 
economies that deregulated their mortgage markets in the 1980s saw faster 
rises and more volatility in house prices than those economies that did not 
(Aron et al. 2012).  One study of the US looked at the impact on house prices 
of bank branching deregulation which benefitted only certain types of banks 
but not others in the same U.S. states between 1994-2005 (Favara & Imbs 
2015). The increased funding enjoyed by the first group of banks from the 
deregulation led them to increase their mortgage lending by between one-half 
and two thirds, which explained between one-third and a half of the observed 
increase in house prices.  However, the banks in the same areas that did not 
benefit from the deregulation did not increase their lending. This provides 
strong evidence that increases in bank credit drive up house prices 
independently of demand-side/endogeneous factors. 
Despite the above evidence, the dominant focus in much of the economics 
literature on house prices is on the supply side (Glaeser et al 2005; 2008).  
Some scholars have noted that those Anglo-Saxon countries that deregulated 
their financial systems most rapidly – the UK, US, Australia – also have less 
flexible planning systems and a less elastic supply of land.  It does appear to 
be the case that Britain and Australia have less flexible planning systems than, 
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for example, continental Europe (Cheshire et al. 2014; Gurran & Whitehead 
2011). However, the legislative changes that impacted on planning in these 
countries mainly took place in the 1950s and 1960s, so they seem less useful in 
explaining the more recent explosion in house prices since the late 1990s.
There are also examples where very rapid increases in housing construction 
(allowed by highly elastic planning regulations) did not temper house price 
booms. The experiences of Spain and Ireland in the run-up to the financial 
crisis show why ‘building more homes’ can never be the simple solution to 
housing affordability problems. Irish house prices doubled in the space of a 
decade between 1997 and 2007, whilst Spanish prices increased by 50% in just 
6 years whilst both countries were undergoing huge construction booms. 
Prices continued upwards until 2007 when the crisis hit, defaults started and 
property values collapsed.  Australia has undergone a similar experience 
more recently, with Sydney and Melbourne undergoing massive 
constructions booms in new apatments in the last five years accompanied by 
increases rather than decreases in prices (Scutt 2016). However fast you can 
build, banks can create new credit faster.
Furthermore, research shows that increases in land and house prices may 
have a ‘crowding out’ effect on bank lending to non-financial firms in favour 
of mortgage lending. A study of bank lending in the US found that increases 
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in house prices led banks to substitute away from commercial lending 
towards mortgage lending (Chakraborty et al. 2016).  The authors found that 
this resulted in a decrease in the investments of firms that had a relationship 
with the affected banks. In other words, increasing land prices negatively and 
potentially permanently effected business investment via reduced lending.
Finally, one argument commonly made by economists is that the rise in 
mortgage debt and hence house prices is attributable mainly to low and 
falling real interest rates experienced in advanced economies since the 1990s 
rather than primarily due to other forms of financial liberalisation and 
deregulation. Low rates have certainly been a contributory factor. However, 
interest rates on their own do not help explain the exceptions to the general 
rule of rising house prices in advanced economies in this period: for example, 
the falling house-price-to-income ratios experienced in Germany, Japan, 
Switzerland and South Korea which had the same falling real interest rates. 
As we shall discuss in section 4, it was policy choices by these countries 
unrelated to interest rates that made them exceptional. 
2.3 Historical emergence of the housing-finance cycle
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The emergence of the housing-finance feedback cycle was driven by the great 
home-owning democracies, the U.S. and the U.K. following the collapse of the 
Bretton-Woods fixed exchange rate regime in the early 1970s.  This led to a 
rapid liberalisation of banking systems in these countries, spurred on by 
ferocious competition between the two nations’ financial centres: New York 
and London (Krippner 2011; Ryan-Collins 2018).  Prior to the 1980s, mortgage 
credit was restricted to conservative mutuals (the Thrifts in the U.S. and 
Building Societies in the UK) by a combination of formal and informal 
regulation.  Mortgage terms were long with fixed interest rates and, in the US, 
often insured and gauranteed by the Federal Housing Administration and 
Veterans Administration.  By the 1950s, 40% of all mortgages were federally 
subsidized (Jorda et al 2016: 122).
Innovations in the financial sector and the internationalization of capital flows 
that followed the breakdown of Bretton Woods weakened these regulations. 
There was also liberalisation and innovation on the liability side of bank’s 
balance sheets. Whilst traditionally banks’ funding was limited to domestic 
retail depositors, from the mid-1970s U.S. banks were able borrow funds from 
outside the U.S. to fund their mortgages, in particular from the largely 
unregulated ‘Euro-dollar’ market. Domestic financial innovations also 
enabled banks to attract deposit funding away from the Thrifts (Krippner 
2005). 
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The neo-conservative administration of Margaret Thatcher responded to the 
resulting growth of the New York financial sector by liberalising the UK 
banking sector and encouraging it into the mortgage market. As with the U.S., 
foreign exchange controls were lifted allowing UK banks to also access the 
Eurodollar market. As part of the ‘Big Bang’ financial reform of 1986, Building 
Societies were permitted to borrow on wholesale markets and quantitative 
restrictions on mortgage lending for banks and mutuals were eased. The 
result was an explosion in domestic mortgage credit from just over 20% of 
GDP in the late 1970s to 55% a decade later; house prices doubled over the 
same period.
The internationalisation and harmonisation of financial regulation along the 
lines of the Anglo-Saxon model following the collapse of Bretton Woods, 
along with the liberalisation of capital controls and the emergence and 
globalisation of residential mortgage-backed securitisation (RMBS), saw 
advanced economies in Australasia and Europe gradually embrace the US-
UK feedback cycle. Under the auspices of the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS), a new regulatory framework was created – the “Basel 
Accords” - that introduced minimum capital requirements for all Banks 
related to the type of assets they held. Loans secured by mortgages on 
residential properties only carried half the risk weight of loans to non-
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financial firms (50%) in the original Basel Accord. Furthermore, securitized 
mortgages, which were viewed as more liquid and thus even less risky, only 
carried a 20% risk weight. The effect of these reforms was to allow banks to 
earn fees and net interest margins on holding 2.5 times more credit risk in real 
estate than they had before without any increase in their capital requirements 
(Persaud 2016 p. 5).  
The key financial innovation was RMBS. This transformed a geographically 
fixed and illiquid asset – a traditional 25 year fixed-rate mortgage loan – into a 
liquid and transparent financial asset which can be bought and sold almost 
anywhere in the world (Gotham 2009).  By opening up housing finance to a 
vast global investment sector it broke down previous national and local 
institutional barriers over the funding of home purchase and transformed the 
banking system. 
In Europe, the combination of low and stable interest rates - a requirement of 
single market membership  - and the acceptance of higher levels of debt over 
longer durations by households and regulators in the 1990s made mortgages a 
more attractive form of asset for institutional investors seeking secure, long-
dated assets. This coincided with the introduction of the Euro in 1999 which 
saw an explosion in capital market activity with the establishment of a Euro-
denominated bond-market. This was more stable than single country bond 
Page 23 of 64
https://mc04.manuscriptcentral.com/epa
EPA: Economy and Space
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
23
markets and provided access to lower cost, long-term funding which helped 
develop wholesale market instruments as alternatives to retail deposits as a 
source of funding for banks, including covered mortgage bonds and RMBS.  
As with the U.S. model, banks would originate loans but then package them 
up in to securities and shift them off their balance sheets to either Special 
Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) sponsored by banks or directly to investors. 
RMBS became an important source of funding in the UK, Australia and 
Ireland in the 1990s and Europe during the early 2000s (Lunde & Whitehead 
2016 p. 25). Securitisation enabled mortgage issuers to offer a wider range of 
mortgage products, to offer mortgages at much lower rates of interest and 
offer them at higher LTV ratios.  This in turn enabled larger numbers of 
people to access home ownership at higher price to income and mortgage-
debt to income ratios. The latter ratio increased by a third or more in many 
countries between 1998 and 2009.
2.4 The post-crisis feedback cycle 
Post-crisis, while maintaining Consumer Price Inflation as their primary 
target, central banks have begun to take a closer interest in monitoring house 
prices and introduced policies aimed at restricting real estate credit to address 
‘systemic risks’ across national economies; so called ‘macroprudential’ policy 
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(Cerutti et al. 2017).ii  Regulators have imposed limits to loan-to-value and 
loan-to-income ratios for mortgages and also targeted buy-to-let and interest 
only mortgages in the UK, Australia, Switzerland, New Zealand and Hong 
Kong. 
Such policies are welcome but there is little sign as yet they are strong enough 
to overcome the strong incentives banks have to lend against landed 
property. After previous house price bubbles, the house price to income ratio 
has generally returned to somewhere near its long-term average. Not so this 
time (Ryan-Collins 2018: p2). Instead, some of the richest and most 
sophisticated economies in the world have become caught up in another 
mortgage credit/house price bubble. House prices in Toronto, capital city of 
Canada, have doubled in the last 5 years. Total outstanding US mortgage 
loans are now back at nearly $15trn, the same as at the 2008 crisis peak. In 
Sweden, the household debt to income ratio reached 179% in 2015, a higher 
rate than the crisis peak in the U.S. in 2008 (Andersson & Jonung 2016).  
A similar story applies in Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and Belgium. 
Meanwhile Australia and New Zealand are the champions of the post-crisis 
house-price boom, seeing the value of property increase from 3 to 4 times 
GDP in the space of just 4 years since 2012 (Bourke 2017), racing far ahead of 
incomes.  The two largest cities, Sydney and Melbourne, averaged 14% and 
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10% annual increases in house prices between 2013 and 2017 respectively. 
And whilst average house prices did fall markedly in the UK and U.S., real 
wages have also flat-lined meaning affordability has not increased as rapidly 
as might have been expected.
Despite taking some steps to regulate mortgage credit, governments and 
central banks must both shoulder the blame for the emergence of this latest 
house price boom. After an initial fiscal stimulus, governments cut back on 
spending and hoped that easy monetary policy – low interest rates – would 
encourage consumption and investment. Since 2009, the American, British, 
Japanese and European central banks have together bought up more than 
$11trillon-worth of government bonds and other safe assets from investors, 
replacing it with zero-interest newly created money via ‘Quantitative Easing’ 
(QE) programmes.  The hope was that this would force investors to invest in 
more risky, real economy debt such as debt and equity issued by companies. 
But the evidence suggests that rather than stimulating real economy growth, 
QE has pumped up asset prices, in particular house prices (Moodys Analytics 
2015). The ‘wall of liquidity’ created by QE catalysed a global search for 
higher yielding but safe assets. Landed property, particularly in international 
cities, proved to be one of the most attractive assets for investors with global 
reach, not least because they could easily source borrowing, backed by 
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property assets, at ultra-low interest rates from a banking sector still hooked 
on real estate. Land in ‘global cities’ such as Paris, New York, London, Hong 
Kong and Toronto has become akin to gold – an essentially speculative but 
still ‘safe’ store of value. Property prices in these cities have ‘synchronized’, 
with price dynamics closer to each other than with domestic cities an regions 
(Brooker 2018). Although speculative buyers from both home and abroad 
usually target ‘prime’ (very expensive) properties, this naturally raises prices 
across these cities and means they become unaffordable for those on middle 
incomes. 
2.5 The role of government policy
The financial deregulation, liberalisation and innovation that led to a huge 
expansion in credit on the supply side was complemented by changes in 
government policy that increased the demand for home ownership. In 
particular changes in taxation and public subsidies made property more 
attractive as a financial asset, as well providing a flow of housing services. 
Anglo-Saxon liberal market economies led the way, beginning the process 
even before the financial deregulation of the 1970s. 
Tax changes favouring home ownership
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In 1963 the UK abolished the ‘Schedule A’ income tax, a tax on imputed rental 
income (the ground rent that a property owner would have had to pay if they 
had not been an owner). Five years later, when capital gains tax was 
introduced, an exemption was made for primary residencies. This 
immediately made private property a more attractive financial asset than 
shares and savings vehicles, both of which attracted hefty taxes. In the late 
1980s, the Thatcher government abolished the local property tax scheme 
(‘Domestic rates’), at the height of the house price and credit boom, replacing 
it with the Poll Tax and later ‘council tax’ which has not been revalued since 
1991, making it highly regressive.  All of these policies meant that property 
owners were able to capture a larger and larger share of the capital gains from 
rising house prices.  Much of this could be realised through mortgage-equity 
withdrawal which was also liberalised in the 1980s.
In the U.S., the twentieth century saw the tax system become systemically 
biased in favour of land and real estate ownership over other forms of 
activity. Prior to the 1930s property taxes accounted for around 2/3rds of state 
and local government tax receipts.  But gradually taxes have been shifted off 
property and on to incomes and consumers (via increasing sales taxes). Today 
property taxes make up only 20% of state and local revenue (Hudson 2012 p. 
227).  
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The maximum capital gains tax rate payable by individuals in the U.S. 
between 1942 and 1995 averaged 27% in contrast to 70% on income. Likewise 
for corporations, the maximum capital gains tax was 28% compared to 45% 
on corporate profits (Hudson 2010 p. 236).  In addition, the tax code permits 
investors to avoid paying tax on real estate at the point of sale if they reinvest 
their sales proceeds to buy new property of equal or greater cost.  Real estate 
is further favoured because land appreciation is not recognized in US 
accounting protocols.  It is treated for tax purposes in the same way as 
depreciable capital – taxed income is considered to be cash flow less 
depreciation.  But real estate does not provide a physical cash flow, but rather 
an imputed flow of income (or imputed rent). Land appreciates since increases 
in land values typically outpace the costs associated with depreciation of the 
physical structures of land.  Yet real estate owners typically are able to offset 
their tax against depreciation whilst capital gains are ignored.  
These changes to taxation in the UK and US made home ownership 
increasingly attractive as a financial asset.  In particular in the cities where 
rapid growth was occurring, home owners were now able to enjoy large 
capital gains – i.e. economic rents - from the simple virtue of owning property 
in an area of rising economic growth and investment.  But there was no 
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political constituency at the time to push back against these developments as 
the desire for home ownership increased and incomes continued to rise. 
Subsidies shift from supply to demand
By the early 1980s, neo-liberal policies had become more entrenched in the 
Anglo-Saxon economies and governments began to withdraw from the direct 
provision of affordable housing and housing finance, instead enabling the 
market to take on a greater role. Rather than subsidizing or investing in the 
supply of housing or land – or indeed building or buying land themselves – 
these states began to shift towards subsidizing the demand for home ownership. 
Selling publicly owned houses to tenants – often at a discount - became a 
popular strategy: it increased home ownership and won votes whilst at the 
same time reducing public expenditure, in particular the costs of 
maintenance. The most spectacular example was the British Conservatives’ 
“Right-to-Buy” legislation which saw 1.5 million publicly owned houses sold 
off in one of the largest ever privatisations of public housing in history, worth 
£40 billion in its first 25 years (Meek 2014). 
In other countries, policies have been more subtle but the direction of travel – 
towards the commodification of housing and privatisation of land rents – has 
been the same (Aalbers 2017). In many countries, tenant protection and rent 
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regulation laws were rescinded leading to an increase in rents and evictions 
(Rolnik 2013). Municipalities were given increased responsibility for 
affordable housing provision but seen their funding to provide it cut 
(Hulchanski 2009). As funding for maintenance was cut, the quality of 
remaining public housing stock deteriorated and housing estates were 
increasingly stigmatized in the public and political imagination.
In most countries today, there is no capital gains due on primary private 
residences and a whole range of other subsidies privileging home ownership 
both as a form of tenure and as a financial asset (OECD 2016, Figure PH 2.2.1).  
Most advanced economies offer mortgage interest relief (MIR) on taxable 
income. In the Netherlands the foregone tax revenue from MIR was estimated 
to be around 2.14% of GDP in 2015 and 0.5% in the U.S. (ibid).  Because the 
ownership of housing is skewed towards older and higher income 
households, this is a highly regressive.  Evidence from both the U.S. (Hilber & 
Turner 2014) and Europe (Matsaganis & Flevotomou 2007) demonstrate that it 
has mainly benefited higher income groups, many of whom will already be 
home owners. 
For neo-liberal governments concerned about rising budget deficits, 
encouraging the personal accumulation of assets such as housing equity as a 
means of meeting the cost of social care and retirement needs in an aging 
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population also made political sense.  ‘Asset-based welfare’ began to emerge 
as a new policy framework with home ownership leading to less support for 
higher taxes to fund universal welfare provision and pensions (Doling & 
Ronald 2010).
 
3. Policies to break the feedback cycle: financial reform
How might it be possible to wean the advanced economy banking sector off 
landed property? In the next two sections, I outline reforms to the financial 
sector and to land and housing policy that might be effective in breaking the  
housing-finance feedback cycle.
3.1 Central banks and financial policy 
As discussed, central banks have begun to implement new policies to restrict 
mortgage credit in the post-crisis period – so called ‘macroprudential policy’ 
(Cerutti et al. 2017). So far, this does not appear to have been effective in 
preventing new house price bubbles in a number of advanced economies.  
One additional policy reform would be for central banks to incorporate asset 
prices in their inflation target (currently house prices are excluded in most 
measures of consumer price inflation).  More generally, financial policy 
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makers – in both central banks and ministries of finance - should now have 
the confidence to more explicitly regulate the quantity and allocation of credit 
for different purposes. During their history, almost all advanced economies 
and many emerging economies – including East Asia - employed forms of 
formal and informal quantity-based credit regulation under various terms, 
including ‘credit guidance’, ‘window guidance’, ‘moral suasion’ (see Bezemer 
et al. 2018 for a review).
Credit for the purchase of land and property was suppressed under these 
regimes as it was seen to produce excessive asset price inflation and 
subsequent banking crises. Most bank credit was allocated to productive 
useiii, either investment in plant and quipment to produce more goods, 
investment to offer more services, or other forms of investment that enhanced 
productivity (such as the implementation of new technologies, processes, and 
know-how) – and often a combination of these (Wade 1990; Wang & Vittas 
1991; Werner 2003). A recent study found that the removal of credit controls 
and credit guidance policies (including the privatisation of state investment 
banks) is strongly correlated with an increase in the share of asset-based 
lending (mainly mortgage debt) in advanced economies (Bezemer et al. 2018).
Domestic regulations of this type would be considerably more effective if they 
were complemented by supportive international regulation. International 
regulators, including the BIS and the IMF, need to reverse the strong 
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favouritism shown towards property lending in terms of capital and liquidity 
requirements to support domestic regulations. Regulations should support 
banks that are able to de-risk their loans via methods other than land-based 
collateral, most obviously via the building up of long-term relationships with 
non-financial businesses, as discussed in the next section. 
3.2 Structural reforms
There may be limits to what regulation can achieve on its own given how 
entrenched mortgage assets have become on modern banks’ balance sheets 
and their strong attachment to collat ral. In addition, the highly competitive 
and globalised nature of banking and capital flows today makes regulation 
easier to ‘game’. Countries might have to re-impose foreign exchange controls 
to prevent foreign banks and shadow banking structures from getting around 
domestic rules.  Given these challenges, institutional and structural reforms to 
banking systems may be appropriate.
Stakeholder banks vs. Shareholder banks
A range of studies suggest that bank lending behaviour is strongly influenced 
by ownership type, size and other institutional factors (Altunbas et al. 2001; 
Ferri et al. 2014; Prieg & Greenham 2012). Since the 1990s, advanced economy 
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banking systems have become less diverse as financial deregulation led to 
waves of mergers and acquisitions, often following financial crises.  Large, 
universal shareholder banks that combine investment- and retail-banking 
functions have become the dominant model in Anglo-Saxon economies. 
Specialist mortgage banks – the Savings and Loans and Building societies  
discussed in the previous section – having demutualised or been absorbed 
into larger universal banks. 
The dominant ownership model for these banks is the publicly listed 
shareholder model.  Shareholder banks typically operate a ‘transaction’ 
banking model (Collins 2012) characterised by a preference for centralised 
and automated credit-scoring techniques to make loan decisions, a need for 
high quarterly returns on equity, and a strong preference for collateral and 
thus property.  Increasingly, the model favours the generation of profits 
through securitisation. The imperatives of short-term shareholder value mean 
that lending to SMEs – involving high transaction costs for relatively small 
loans – does not make business sense for larger banks (Berger & Udell 2002).
By contrast, in other countries, for example Germany, Switzerland and 
Austria, there is a much stronger culture of ‘relationship banking’. In 
Germany, two-thirds of bank deposits are controlled by either cooperative or 
public savings banks, most of which are owned by regional or local people 
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and/or businesses.  These ‘stakeholder banks’  are more focused on business 
lending, do not have such stringent collateral requirements and devolve 
decision making to branches (Prieg & Greenham 2012).  They de-risk their 
loans not by requiring property as collateral but by building up strong and 
long-lasting relationships and an understanding of the businesses they lend 
to.  Although the general pattern in advanced economies has been a shift 
towards mortgage lending, in Germany lending to non-financial businesses is 
significantly higher than mortgage lending at 40% of GDP, whilst mortgage 
lending has only increased to around 30% of GDP.  This stands in marked 
contrast to the advanced economy average of 70% mortgage credit and 50% 
non-mortgage (Ryan-Collins 2018: 103) and likely plays a significant role in 
German households enjoying a falling house-price to income ratio for most of 
the last 4 decades (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: House price-to-income ratio in Germany, Japan, Korea and Anglo-Saxon economies 
indexed to long term average (=100).
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Empirical studies find that ‘stakeholder’ banks, including public savings 
banks and cooperative banks, maintain their lending – both mortgage and 
non-mortgage - in the face of financial shocks (e.g. changes in interest rates) in 
contrast to shareholder banks which are much more pro-cyclical (Ferri et al. 
2014; Beck et al. 2018). This is unsurprising if their models of lending are 
based on relationships rather than collateral values – a bank with a long and 
strong relationship with a firm is much more likely to have the confidence to 
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continue lending during a downturn and may also have a better grasp of the 
local and regional economy. 
State investment banks
Another way of supporting non-collateralised lending to support productive 
activity and priority-infrastructure (including affordable housing) would be 
the creation of - or greater support for - State Investment Banks (SIBs) (also 
known as ‘development banks’ or ‘public banks’). These institutions are 
government-owned or sponsored financial institutions concerned primarily 
with the provision of strategic and usually longterm finance to industry (De 
Aghion 1999). 
Development banks are recognized as having played a crucial role in the 
rapid industrialization process of continental Europe in the 19th century, 
providing the patient capital necessary to build railroads and canals across 
the continent and in the process revolutionizing capitalist production.  One of 
the largest examples from the 19th century was the French Crédit Mobilieriv 
bank, founded in 1852 by followers of the French socialist thinker and 
reformer Henri de Saint-Simon. Its name is revealing. In contrast to the 
common mortgage bank (Sociétés du Crédit Foncier) or ‘land banks’, which lent 
money on the security of immovable property, the Crédit Mobilier aimed to loan 
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to the owners of movable property and so to promote industrial enterprise 
(Hudson & Bezemer 2012 p. 7). The bank funded transport infrastructure in 
France via low-interest long-term equity investment and bond finance, rather 
than the short-term higher interest lending provided by French family banks 
such as the Rothschilds (Hudson 2011 pp. 13–14). The Crédit Mobilier also 
enabled the development of railroads across the rest of Europe by supporting 
other continental development banks, via share ownership and the provision 
of engineers and expert knowledge. 
State sponsored banks were also key to rebuilding western and East Asian 
economies in the aftermath of the Great Depression and World War II when 
mortgage finance dried up and or property was destroyed on a major scale.  
The U.S. Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) was a central component 
of the Roosevelt’s New Deal, financing a huge expansion in infrastructure in 
the 1930s (Todd 1992). State investment banks played a key role in the rapid 
growth of East Asian countries in the 1970s and 1980s – the so called ‘East 
Asian miracle’ (Stiglitz & Uy 1996).  Globally, by the 1970s, governments 
owned 50 percent of assets of the largest banks in industrial countries and 70 
percent of assets of the largest banks in developing countries (Levy-Yeyati et 
al. 2004 p. 2).  The emergence of neo-liberal policies in the 1980s and 1990s, as 
described in section 3, saw a wave of privatisations of public banks. From 
1987 to 2003, more than 250 banks were privatized (Megginson 2005).
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Development banks can play an important role stimulating innovation 
because of their capacity to provide patient long-term capital to potential 
growth sectors (such as green energy for example) that private sector venture 
capitalists find too risky or too low-yielding (Mazzucato & Penna 2015). For 
example, a recent study found that a large proportion of patient capital 
supporting green energy projects came from public institutions, including 
SIBs, rather than the private sector sources more usually associated with 
financing innovation (Mazzucato & Semieniuk 2017). Historically and in the 
present, SIBs have also supported SMEs that otherwise struggle to attain 
finance from the commercial banking sector and who in many cases lack 
property-based collateral. Both the German and Canadian SIBs, both set up in 
the post-war period, have played a key role in supporting SME sectors 
throughout their 60 year history.   Germany and South Korea, which have 
both enjoyed falling house price-to-income ratios in the last two decades 
(Figure 2) both have large SIBs.
4. Policies to break the feedback cycle: Land policy reforms 
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4.1 Reforming fiscal policy: a land-value tax 
Reforms to the banking system would suppress perhaps the most important 
source of finance flowing in to property – newly created credit and money. 
But in the post crisis world of low interest rates, land and housing will remain 
a highly attractive financial asset for speculative investment. Reversing the 
fiscal favouritism for home ownership and treating landed property in the 
same way as any other financial asset would appear a logical step if we are to 
bring house prices back to levels closer to incomes. 
One proposal, supported by economists from across the political spectrum, 
would be a tax on the increasing value of land, or land value tax (LVT), most 
famously proposed by Henry George (1879). This would involve an annual 
tax on the incremental increase in the unimproved market value of land that 
would fall upon the landowner.  The advantage of the tax is that it would 
accurately capture the economic gains deriving from public and private 
investment in a location – such as a new school or better transport 
infrastructure - not due to the land-owner’s own efforts; in other words the 
tax would capture for the public purse economic rent.   
By attaching a cost to owning land, LVT diminishes the incentive to buy land 
for speculative purposes – i.e. to realize capital gains – rather than productive 
purposes or simply to provide shelter. Knowing that any increase in the value 
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of a property would be taxed should lead to a shift towards households 
purchasing a house purely on the basis of its value as a place to live – i.e a 
consumption good - rather than a financial asset. There would also be less 
incentive for developers to hoard undeveloped land. Such a tax would likely 
end the practice of ‘land banking’ or ‘slow release’ that is a problem in 
countries like the UK and Australia where developers have no incentives to 
build and sell property efficiently because the capital gains on their assets are 
rising, despite the shortage of housing the country faces (Ryan-Collins et al. 
2017 pp. 200–201).
A tax on land should naturally reduce mortgage lending. Under current 
arrangements, as land values increase, land owners/home owners benefit 
from most of this increase as the value of their properties increase. The larger 
the increase in land values and thus property equity, the larger the loan the 
bank will be prepared to make, all else being equal.  Of course, the larger the 
loan relative to equity, the more of the economic rent will flow to the bank in 
the form of interest payments. With a sizeable land value tax, most of the 
increase in land values flows to the public purse leaving just a small 
proportion for the household to use as collateral. This would inevitably 
reduce the size of mortgage loans and the rentier interest profits flowing to 
banks.
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There are major political challenges with implementing property taxes in 
western democracies where home ownership and the idea of wealth 
generation from the home has become culturally entrenched. Today 
‘immovable property taxes’ make up just 1% of GDP and 2.5 per cent of total 
tax revenues on average across the OECD economies (Blöchliger 2015 p. 6). 
There are genuine fairness issues in some cases – in particular where a 
household or individual is asset rich but cash poor, meaning a tax would 
significantly reduce their income.
To overcome these concerns, any land tax should be introduced as part of a 
wider tax reform that would reduce other unpopular and regressive taxes 
such as income or sales taxes (research shows land taxes are more 
economically efficient than other taxes (Arnold et al. 2011; Blöchliger 2015)).  
Exemptions for low-income home-owners, or allowing homeowners to defer 
payment until sale, may reduce the political difficulties of land taxes. Or 
home-owners could give up a percentage of their equity in the property each 
year that wasn’t paid to the state, enabling the community to gain from any 
capital appreciation (Mayhew & Smith 2014).
Another option would be to hypothecate the proceeds of a large-scale land tax 
evenly across the population as some kind of universal basic income, or 
perhaps hypothecate it to support a widely popular public service such as 
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national healthcare. Reframing a property tax as a shared citizens’ ‘land 
dividend’ could make it more appealing in the public imagination.  Finally, 
reducing the saliency of the tax by withholding it at source from employment 
or pension income could make politically more acceptable.
Ultimately, the biggest challenge facing the implementation of taxes on land 
and property are the vested interests facing significant wealth losses from 
such a policy. Nevertheless, the stagnation of incomes and ageing 
demographics that have been a feature of advanced economies over recent 
decades suggest the policy may become more politically attractive.  Recently 
there have been calls by major international bodies including the OECD 
(Blöchliger 2015) and the IMF (Norregaard 2013) for an increase in property 
taxation as the tax best placed to boost growth in the post-crisis period.  As 
incomes decline and wealth increases, and financial wealth becomes ever 
harder to locate and tax, it may become increasingly tempting for politicians 
to turn to land and property taxation to maintain tax bases. 
4.2 Land ownership reforms
The risk with LVT, as with any tax, is that it could be easily reversed by a new 
government.  By keeping land – and the economic value of land – outside the 
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market economy and the financial system completely, the banking sector 
would be forced to find alternative ways of de-risking its lending. Few banks 
will be prepared to lend purely against the deteriorating value of the 
structures on top of a location.
In mainstream economic theory, private property and home ownership has 
generally been thought of as beneficial. However a number of empirical 
studies find a positive relationship between the growth of home ownership 
and increasing unemployment in a given area or country (Blanchflower & 
Oswald 2013; Laamanen 2013). Countries with high levels of home ownership 
will likely have less mobile populations, reducing the efficiency of the 
distribution of labour and increasing the likelihood of NIMBY-ISM  (Not In 
My Backyard-ISM) that may impede economic development. Whilst the rise 
in home ownership in the 1945-1970s period certainly coincided with 
widespread increases in prosperity, since the 1970s, growth rates have fallen, 
inequality of wealth and income has risen and financial instability increased 
despite a continued growth in home ownership. 
One alternative is public ownership of land. At its simplest, public ownership 
serves to remove land from the market in perpetuity and socialise rents in the 
process. Public land ownership today is widespread, and takes many forms: 
from public parks and public highways, to social housing and heritage 
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buildings. Holding land under permanent public ownership can ensure that 
such socially desirable uses are preserved in particular locations when market 
forces would dictate that they make way for more profitable uses, squeezing 
affordability. 
In Singapore, a densely populated city-state island of 3.9m residents, 90% of 
the land is owned by the state which leases it out for development, enabling it 
to capture land value increases as leases come up for renewal. 82% of the 
resident population lives in high quality public housing provided by the 
state-owned Housing Development Board.  The Central Provident Fund 
(CPF), a compulsory savings scheme sfor both employers and employees, 
invests its balances in government debt and the government issues a variety 
of affordable housing loans to the HDB. This creates a virtuous circle of 
socialised non-bank mortgage finance that has proven effective at providing 
affordable housing (Phang 2001 p. 449). The average house price to income 
ratio in Singapore is one of the lowest in Asia and has been falling since a 
housing bubble in the mid-1990s. Meanwhile, the system provides the 
Singapore Government with a handsome source of public revenues. In 2012 
alone government receipts from land sales totalled the equivalent of £9.1 
billion (Purves 2015). 
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In South Korea, around half of all residential land development and almost all 
industrial land development is carried out by the Korean Land Corporation 
(KLC)v. Since being formed in 1975, the KLC has played a key role in 
transforming the economy of South Korea by efficiently managing land and 
promoting economic development. The KLC’s functions include developing 
and selling land for residential use, acquiring idle and vacant land for resale 
at current usage prices and developing new towns (Kaganova 2011). This has 
helped ensure that land and housing has remained affordable in South Korea, 
as shown in Figure 2. 
Of course, majority state ownership of land may not be politically feasible in 
many western countries.  However, similar principles can apply at a smaller 
scale. If public sector entities are willing and able to purchase sufficient land 
for entire new settlements, it becomes fairly easy for the public body to 
capture all of the land value created by the development of the new town, 
enabling the cost of the original land purchase to be made up and exceeded, 
with profits put in to further upgrades to infrastructure. This is the model that 
was used successfully in the development of New Towns in the UK in the 
1960s (DCLG 2006).  
A similar approach can be used to capture the land value uplift created by the 
provision of infrastructure. if a public body acquires land at pre-development 
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prices, it can then sell or lease the land at development prices upon 
completion of the new infrastructure – thereby capturing the rent itself. This 
form of land value capture has been perhaps most effectively used to finance 
Hong Kong’s Mass Transit Railway (Purves 2015).
These kinds of benefits could be achieved on a national basis by establishing 
national land banks or development authorities responsible for purchasing, 
developing and selling land for residential and commercial use following the 
Korea model. These land banks could use public money to buy land without 
planning permission and then lease or sell land to private developers at 
development prices following the grant of planning permission. As well as 
being a source of land release for housing and other development, the 
increase in land values could provide significant sources of revenue for the 
government.
4.3 Alternative tenure patterns
Tenure patterns play an important role in mediating the impact of 
deregulation and innovation in the financial sector.  The higher the levels of 
home ownership in an economy, the greater the impacts of such 
developments are likely to be. This is because renters are not in a position to 
leverage against their property. The general pattern of home ownership in 
advanced economies has been an increase from around 40% home ownership 
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in the 1940s to closer to 60% by the 2000s (Jordà et al. 2016 p. 121)(Jordà et al. 
2016 p. 121). But there are some interesting exceptions. Not all countries 
implemented changes in policies to boost private home ownership and 
mortgages. Germany, Austria and Switzerland, where home ownership rates 
are below 50%, provide good counter-examples.
In Germany, loan-to-value ratios at savings and mortgage banks (the main 
providers of home loans) were often capped at 60%. At the same time, the 
comparatively high levels of rent protection that were put in place in the 
immediate post-war years were upheld in the following decades. In addition, 
the German tax code provided only limited incentives to take on debt. As a 
consequence, the home ownership rate in Germany stood at 43% in 2013 and 
was hence only marginally higher than the 39% ratio reached in 1950. 
Switzerland is one of the few remaining advanced economies that still levies 
taxes on the imputed rents of house owners. It also has rent caps in many 
cities and many Cantons ban foreigners from buying up property. Home 
ownership in Switzerland levelled out at around 35% in the past half century.  
And, also like Germany, Switzerland has a more devolved fiscal, planning 
and banking system with the Cantons having considerable autonomy over 
these issues.
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There is little evidence that economies where private home ownership 
dominates as a form of tenure are more productive or efficient. Easy access to 
housing credit may provide a short-term boost to consumption but ultimately 
results in greater financial fragility and growing wealth inequality.  Housing 
policies should be tenure neutral in terms of subsidies or taxes offered or 
taken by the state. The private rented sector should be made as secure as 
possible, with long guaranteed tenancies, limitations on rent rises and strong 
tenants’ rights. Government should take steps to boost the stock of non-
market housing including homes with social rents, community-led schemes 
and co-operatives to ensure that different housing types and sizes are 
available in all tenures, and to make housing supply less dependent on the 
volatile private market in land and homes. Finally, decent investment 
alternatives and secure pensions should be provided so that households are 
less prone to invest in the housing market to pay for their retirement, or to 
rely on it to fund their care in old age. 
5. Conclusion
Housing affordability presents a major challenge in modern capitalist 
economies. This is because the major cause of the affordability crisis is the 
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interaction of two of its central pillars: private landed property and a 
deregulated financial system.  Their interaction creates a feedback cycle that 
came to dominate Anglo-Saxon economies since the 1980s and, via the 
harmonization of cross-border financial flows, banking regulation and 
financial innovation, also European economies since the 1990s (with some 
important exceptions). At its heart, the cycle involves an elastic supply of 
credit and finance flowing in to an inherently scarce, fixed and irreproducible 
asset, land (or desirable location), with inevitable inflationary consequences.  
The deregulation and liberalisation of the financial system, initiated by the 
U.S. and U.K. in the late 1970s and early 1980s led to an enormous expansion 
in mortgage credit supply, flowing mainly in to existing property. This has 
been complemented by fiscal favouritism for home ownership over other 
tenures, through both taxation and subsidies, leading households to 
increasingly view property as a financial asset as well as a consumption good 
and attracting investment funds.  The affordability crisis can thus be seen as 
primarily a demand-side problem, yet policy makers have largely focused 
attention on supply-side issues such as insufficient new building of homes, 
excessive immigration and restrictive planning rules.
The housing finance-feedback cycle is economically inefficient, incentivising 
investment in unproductive property, but has strong self-perpetuating 
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dynamics because a majority of the middle-class population in advanced 
economies own homes and have enjoyed significant capital gains – there is no 
longer a simple dichotomy between rentier landowners and workers. Home 
equity withdrawal has enabled these households to monetize a proportion of 
these gains and propped up consumer demand.  But this debt-driven growth 
model involves a high level of rent extraction and generates increasing wealth 
inequalities as the young and those outside cities are shut out of the process.  
Ultimately, such a model also generates financial instability and crisis as 
rising debt levels eventually eat in to demand.   
The housing-finance feedback cycle is more than just a minor ‘market failure’.  
Unregulated banks will naturally incline towards asset-backed lending given 
the attractiveness of land as a form of collateral. As a result, demand-side 
reforms are needed. These include regulatory and structural changes to the 
ownership of banks to support business-lending over property lending; and 
major changes to taxation, subsidies and tenure policies.  Important lessons 
can be learned from economically successful countries such as Germany, 
Singapore and South Korea which have shown that the financialisation of 
housing is not an inevitability. 
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